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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 10 September to 24 November 2017

I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the period from 10 September to 24 November 2017, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 2361 (2017).

II. Situation in the area of operation and activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was maintained, albeit in a volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and notwithstanding a number of violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces (Disengagement of Forces Agreement) of 1974, which are described below. The Syrian armed forces and non-State armed opposition groups engaged in exchanges of heavy weapons fire in the area of separation and the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Different armed groups, including the listed terrorist group Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly the Nusrah Front)[1] and Jaysh Khalid Ibn al-Walid,[2] which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continued to exchange fire in the UNDOF area of operation. As underscored again by the Security Council in its resolution 2361 (2017), there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

3. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line that it observes. All incidents of firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as the

[1] In July 2016, the Nusrah Front announced that it had changed its name to Jabhat Fath al Sham and declared that it had cut ties with Al-Qaida.

[2] The merger between Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and Harakat al Muthana was initially announced on 12 April 2016. On 24 May 2016 open sources reported that both groups were operating under the umbrella name of "Jaysh Khalid Ibn al-Walid". On 20 July 2017, the group was listed by the Security Council, pursuant to annex III of resolution 2368 (2017), as being associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida.

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crossing by individuals of the ceasefire line, are violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. In its regular interaction with both sides, the leadership of UNDOF continued to call upon both parties to exercise restraint and prevent any miscalculations that might lead to an escalation of the situation. That was particularly the case when it responded to incidents of spillover and retaliatory fire.

4. Fighting intensified on 3 November in the northern part of the area of separation and the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Armed groups launched an attack involving heavy machine gun, small arms and indirect fire from the tri-village area of Jubbata al-Khashab, Turunjah and Ufaniyah in the area of separation against pro-Government forces in the vicinity of Hadar, which is largely inhabited by members of the Druze community. On the same day, approximately 200 civilians from Majdal Shams, which is inhabited by members of the Druze community on the Alpha side, gathered at the Israeli technical fence gate leading to United Nations observation post 73, reportedly in support of the Druze community in Hadar. The civilians proceeded to dismantle the Israeli technical fence gate and began to move east of the fence, crossing the ceasefire line and approaching observation post 73. Approximately 150 Israel Defense Forces personnel, equipped with riot control equipment, were deployed in the area. Israel Defense Forces personnel prevented the civilians from moving further, escorting them back to the western side of the technical fence. The civilians left the area later that same evening.

5. Preceding the attack, open sources reported that a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeted a pro-Syrian forces checkpoint in Hadar, killing nine people. Observation post 73 reported that a pro-Government forces position was being contested by armed groups from the tri-village area. Because of the proximity of observation post 73 to Hadar, the UNDOF Force Reserve Company was deployed to an area overlooking the observation post in order to monitor the situation. On 8 and 9 September, high explosive rounds, heavy machine gun bursts, cannon rounds and small arms shots were heard and observed taking place between armed groups operating from the tri-village area of Jubbata al-Khashab, Turunjah and Ufaniyah and pro-Government forces in the area of Hadar.

6. During the reporting period, there were three reports, on 18, 19 and 21 October, of spillover fire from the Bravo side across the ceasefire line into the Alpha side. On 18 October, UNDOF received reports from the Israel Defense Forces that high explosive fire from the vicinity of Camp Faouar on the Bravo side had impacted the Alpha side. UNDOF personnel did not observe the spillover fire or visit the impact site of the alleged spillover fire, as the Israel Defense Forces indicated that the site was inside a minefield. UNDOF was, therefore, not in a position to verify the incident. On 19 October, UNDOF observed aerial explosions in the vicinity of United Nations position 12. On the same day, open sources reported that spillover fire from the Bravo side had impacted across the ceasefire line and that the Israel Defense Forces had carried out airstrikes in response to the incident. UNDOF did not observe the alleged incident of spillover fire. On 21 October, UNDOF also received reports from the Israel Defense Forces that spillover fire from the Bravo side involving four separate rockets had impacted west of the ceasefire line. UNDOF did not observe the occurrence of the incident. On that occasion, the Israel Defense Forces requested UNDOF to investigate the incident. UNDOF immediately dispatched a team to investigate the alleged rocket impacts. Owing to the presence of unexploded ordnance at one of the sites of impact of the rockets, the UNDOF team was only able to carry out an investigation at the other three sites. The UNDOF team concluded that 122mm calibre rockets had been fired in the preceding 6 to 12 hours across the ceasefire line and that the rockets appeared to have originated from a north-easterly direction. The investigation team could not determine the exact origin of the rockets or the perpetrators.

7. According to open sources, the Israel Defense Forces responded to the incidents with retaliatory fire across the ceasefire line. UNDOF was unable to confirm the occurrence of those incidents. Syrian officials informed UNDOF that the Syrian armed forces were not responsible for the firing of any artillery rounds or munitions across the ceasefire line and that they were concerned that the actions of the Israel Defense Forces escalated tension across the ceasefire line.

8. On 25 September, UNDOF observed an aerial strike in the vicinity of a Syrian armed forces camp south-east of Camp Faouar. This observation coincided with open source reports of an Israeli airstrike in the same area. On 25 October, United Nations personnel at observation post 73 heard an unmanned aerial vehicle operating in the vicinity of the observation post. On 6 November, UNDOF personnel on Mount Hermon reported hearing an aircraft flying in a north-easterly direction from the Camp Faouar.

9. On Mount Hermon, instances of interaction between Israel Defense Forces personnel and individuals from the Bravo side continued to be observed by UNDOF personnel. UNDOF cannot confirm or verify the nature of these interactions, which typically involved unidentified individuals from the Bravo side, with unloaded mules, approaching the Israeli technical fence as well as Israel Defense Forces positions and returning to the Bravo side with mules carrying unidentified supplies. On 13 separate occasions, 3 in September and 10 in October, UNDOF observed a total of 229 mules and 127 individuals involved in such interactions. On 21 October, an Observer Group Golan patrol observed boxes with clear ammunition markings in the vicinity of a United Nations temporary observation post on the Alpha side.

10. During the reporting period, UNDOF also observed 16 transborder movements between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in September, involving 49 individuals, and 2 such movements in October. On 27 October, armed individuals stopped an UNDOF resupply convoy in the Mount Hermon complex in the area of separation and demanded food and water. The UNDOF troops refused to comply with the request and as the convoy proceeded to move, small arms fire in the air was heard.

11. In addition, UNDOF continued to observe, on a daily basis, the crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians, primarily shepherds, from the Bravo side to the Alpha side. On 6 November, in the vicinity of observation post 54, in the southern part of the area of separation, civilians from the Bravo side were observed entering on foot an Israel Defense Forces position on the Alpha side and subsequently leaving, crossing the ceasefire line and moving towards Al Mullaqah on the Bravo side. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that there was a hospital located adjacent to their position, which was providing humanitarian assistance to local civilians.

12. In the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict, the northern part of the area of separation and limitation saw fighting of medium- and high-level intensity between the Syrian armed forces and armed groups, particularly in the Bayt Jinn pocket area, which consists of the towns of Bayt Jinn, Mazra'at Bayt Jinn and Mughur al-Mir. The armed groups Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham are reportedly in control of the Bayt Jinn pocket area. During the reporting period, the Syrian armed forces engaged in indirect fire and aerial strikes against the armed groups, with the fighting impacting the surrounding towns of Arneh, Durbol, Hinah and Harfa.

13. On 28 September, the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in Bayt Jinn engaged in heavy fighting. UNDOF observed and heard high explosive rounds impacting the Bayt Jinn area and also landing in the central part of the area of separation. During the fighting, several high explosive rounds impacted within 50 to 150 metres of Camp Faouar, forcing UNDOF personnel to move into bunkers. On the same day, Observer Group Golan personnel at the United Nations temporary

observation post on Mount Hermon observed six heavy machine gun rounds impact within five metres of their observation post. The UNDOF rapid reaction group based on Mount Hermon deployed to the observation post and safely extracted the military observers and conveyed them to the United Nations Mount Hermon Base position.

14. On 6 October, Observer Group Golan personnel at a temporary position on Mount Hermon observed small rounds impacting close to their position. The UNDOF rapid reaction group based on Mount Hermon deployed to the location and safely extracted the military observers and conveyed them to the United Nations Mount Hermon Base position. Because of the security situation, presence at two temporary observation posts on Mount Hermon was suspended temporarily and has not been reinstated to date.

15. The fighting between armed groups and the Syrian armed forces in the central part of the areas of separation and limitation occurred at medium- to low-level intensity. Throughout the reporting period, an artillery gun was observed at a firing position in the vicinity of Qunaytirah firing north at various times. On 12 October, more than 90 high explosive impacts were heard in the central part of the area of separation. On 24 October, exchanges of heavy machine gun and small arms fire were heard and observed in the areas between Batinah and Khan Arnabah. On 27 October, two armed elements were observed standing in front of a house approximately 900 metres north of United Nations observation post 51 in the Qahtaniyah area; one of the armed elements was observed firing his weapon in the general direction of the observation post. On 4 November, United Nations personnel at observation post 51 went into bunkers for a short period after they heard incoming artillery fire close to their post. On 11 November, three high explosive rounds landed in the vicinity of an UNDOF reconnaissance patrol close to observation post 56.

16. In the southern part of the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, which remain, for the most part, under the control of non-State armed groups, including those listed by the Security Council as terrorist groups, fighting continued between armed groups, especially Jaysh Khalid Ibn al-Walid, on one side, and the Free Syrian Army and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, on the other. According to open sources, the fighting was concentrated around the area of Tasil in the area of limitation. There was a spike in military activities on 24 October, with heavy explosive rounds and heavy machine gun bursts heard approximately 10 kilometres south-east of observation post 54 and position 80. In the area around Yarmouk Basin, in the southern part of the area of separation, there were open source reports of Israeli airstrikes targeting areas in Sahaem al-Jawlan, in which 12 personnel of Jaysh Khalid Ibn al-Walid were reportedly killed.

17. The military violations on the Alpha side included 29 reports of M109 self-propelled guns, Iron Dome systems, missile carriers, light armoured vehicles and armoured patrol vehicles within the 10-kilometre zone, which are considered unauthorized military equipment in the area of limitation. There were 25 restrictions of movement of UNDOF by the Israel Defense Forces recorded during the reporting period.

18. Engagement between UNDOF and the Israel Defense Forces continued to endeavour to reduce delays and challenges experienced by United Nations personnel in crossing through the technical fence to United Nations observation posts and positions.

19. UNDOF protested all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it observed to both parties, including the crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians from the Bravo side, the presence of unauthorized equipment and armed individuals in the area of separation and firing into the area of separation. UNDOF

continued to remind the parties of their obligation to scrupulously abide by the terms of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground and to extend all cooperation to UNDOF in the fulfilment of the tasks that it is obligated to fulfil under its mandate.

20. During the reporting period, UNDOF observed several locations where 437 tents and other structures appeared to have been set up for internally displaced persons in the area of separation and in its proximity. The number of people in the camps could not be ascertained and appeared to fluctuate. Owing to the closure of the established crossing point at Qunaytirah between the Alpha and Bravo sides since late August 2014, UNDOF remains unable to facilitate, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, humanitarian crossings, including for students, between the two sides.

21. Since its temporary relocation from a number of positions in September 2014, and pending its full return to the area of separation, UNDOF has continued to maintain visibility, albeit limited, of the area of separation and the ceasefire line from its positions on Mount Hermon, Camp Faouar, position 80 in the southern part of the area of separation and position 22 on the Alpha side. UNDOF operations continued to be supported by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers in Observer Group Golan, who are under the operational control of UNDOF and have maintained five fixed and four temporary observation posts along the Alpha line, as well as four temporary observation posts on Mount Hermon. The focus of the activities of Observer Group Golan was on continuous static observation and situational awareness. Observer Group Golan-Damascus also continued operations on Mount Hermon. The operations on Mount Hermon will be suspended with the onset of winter and resumed in the spring.

22. Through Observer Group Golan, UNDOF continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied the inspection teams. Inspections in the area of limitation on the Bravo side remained suspended owing to the security situation.

23. UNDOF, in consultation with both parties, continued to review the situation in the area of separation to assess whether the conditions on the ground permitted the return to vacated positions in the area of separation. In this regard, UNDOF conducted assessment visits and continuously monitored the prevailing security situation in the area of separation, mainly in the vicinity of United Nations observation posts 52, 56, 71 and 72 and positions 10 and 16.

24. During the reporting period, UNDOF made progress towards the limited return to Bravo side operations, in line with the phased UNDOF plan. Following the completion of phase 1 of the plan, with the re-establishment of the UNDOF presence at Camp Faouar on 14 November 2016, UNDOF continued to develop the infrastructure at Camp Faouar and steadily improve the living conditions at the camp. The security and defence of the camp have been continuously practiced, and all deployed elements have been integrated into a cohesive and effective component, with clear command and control mechanisms. The deployment of the remainder of the mechanized infantry company from Nepal occurred at the end of September, resulting in the activation of phase 2 of the plan from 25 September.

25. Conditions permitting, phase 2 of the plan will involve, over a period of six to eight months, an initial period of resumption of limited patrolling of the northern part of the area of separation by the Nepalese mechanized infantry company from Camp Faouar. This phase will also involve the refurbishment of facilities and security infrastructure of select observation posts in the area of separation. The return of the headquarters of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan from their

temporary headquarters in Ya'fur, Damascus, and the return of the Force Reserve Company from Camp Ziouani to Camp Faouar are planned to take place during phase 3. The reoccupation of observation posts 56, 71 and 72 are also envisaged for phase 3. Observer Group Golan will not be deployed at observation posts on a permanent basis until such time as the security conditions permit and adequate accommodation and appropriate force protection measures are in place.

26. In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 2361 (2017) and the UNDOF operational concept, the mission continued its efforts to deploy appropriate technology to ensure the safety and security of UNDOF personnel and equipment. A surveillance trailer has been deployed on the Alpha side to Camp Ziouani and position 22 and another has been deployed to Camp Faouar. A training programme has been initiated on the use of the equipment by UNDOF personnel. Additional surveillance trailers are expected to be deployed in other United Nations posts. In addition, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to engage with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government of Israel regarding the "sense and warn" system, the technical specifications of which were shared with the parties in July 2017. The responses of the parties are still pending. The Security Council will continue to be updated, as necessary, on progress made and challenges encountered in this respect.

27. UNDOF continued to resupply its positions on Mount Hermon and Camp Faouar from Damascus. On 26 October, the UNDOF daily convoy moving from Camp Faouar to Ya'fur, Damascus, on the Al Salam highway observed two impacts of indirect fire within 2 km of the highway in the area of limitation. The convoy continued along its route to Ya'fur. This was the fifth such incident this year along this route. UNDOF continuously monitors the situation and takes the necessary precautionary measures in planning and conducting its convoys along main supply route 7 and Al Salam highway.

28. UNDOF followed closely the developments related to the de-escalation zone in the south-west part of the Syrian Arab Republic, which was established in accordance with an agreement reached on 9 July between Jordan, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Given the partial overlap between the de-escalation zone and the UNDOF area of operation, UNDOF maintained contact with all relevant interlocutors to seek clarity with regard to the arrangements envisaged under the agreement and their potential implications for UNDOF. The continuation of these contacts is particularly important in facilitating the implementation of the UNDOF mandate, the freedom of movement of the Force as well as the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

29. As at 9 November, UNDOF comprised 976 troops, including 30 women. Troops are currently deployed from Bhutan (3), Czechia (2), Fiji (305), Finland (2), India (189), Ireland (136), Nepal (337) and the Netherlands (2). In addition, 70 military observers from UNTSO/Observer Group Golan, including 8 women, assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

30. In its resolution 2361 (2017), the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973), decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months until 31 December 2017 and requested the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973). The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), is addressed in my report on the situation

in the Middle East (A/72/333), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 71/24 on the Syrian Golan and 71/25 on Jerusalem.

31. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. The Syrian conflict is further reducing the prospects for their resumption and for progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

IV. Financial aspects

32. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/306 appropriated the amount of $57.7 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018.

33. As at 14 November 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNDOF amounted to $11.5 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,812.9 million.

34. Reimbursement of troop costs has been made for the period up to 31 July 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 30 June 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

V. Observations

35. I note with concern the recent military activity across the ceasefire line, in particular the incidents of spillover and retaliatory fire that occurred in October. All military activities across the ceasefire line are of deep concern. They jeopardize the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and have the potential to escalate tensions. I encourage members of the Security Council to support efforts to sensitize both parties and regional stakeholders to the risks of escalation and the need to preserve the long-standing ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

36. As previously reported by UNDOF, the Israel Defense Forces hold the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic responsible for any spillover fire incidents that impact the Alpha side, regardless of the point of origin. It remains critical that the parties maintain their liaison with UNDOF, in the first instance, to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. All violations of the ceasefire line increase tensions between the signatories of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. For its part, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to ensure that the long-standing ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to hold.

37. I remain gravely concerned by the prevailing security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and its implications for the stability of the wider region. The continued fighting on the Bravo side between the Syrian armed forces and armed groups, and between different armed groups, including listed terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Fath al-Sham, and ISIL affiliates, such as Jaysh Khalid Ibn al-Walid, in the southern part of the UNDOF area of operation, jeopardize the long-term ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and continue to significantly affect UNDOF mandate implementation and the UNDOF area of operation.

38. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF. I call upon all parties to the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation, and to remove all military equipment and all armed personnel from the area of separation.

39. Interaction between the Israel Defense Forces and unidentified individuals from the Bravo side, including in the area of Mount Hermon, has the potential to lead to clashes between armed elements and the Syrian armed forces. I reiterate my call to both parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement regarding the requirement to maintain stability in the area. All military activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the ceasefire and to the local civilian population, in addition to the United Nations personnel on the ground. I call upon all parties to take all measures necessary to protect civilians.

40. The Israel Defense Forces should refrain from firing across the ceasefire line. The firing across the ceasefire line by the Israel Defense Forces has the potential to escalate tensions between the two sides. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons and equipment in the area of limitation on the Alpha side is also of concern.

41. As UNDOF continues to consolidate its presence at Camp Faouar and maintains its efforts to intensify its operations in the area of separation, it remains critical that the safety and security of United Nations personnel be assured. The circumstances under which the troops and military observers are operating remain complex and challenging, and require continued vigilance and risk mitigation measures. I renew my call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to fulfil its primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the Bravo side. I also renew my call on countries with influence to strongly and urgently convey to the armed groups in the UNDOF area of operation the imperative to cease any action in violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, including actions that jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel, and to enable UNDOF to carry out its mandate safely and securely.

42. Both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have stated their continued commitment to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the presence of UNDOF in calling for a return to vacated positions in the area of separation. The full return of UNDOF to the area of separation remains a priority for the mission, conditions permitting.

43. It is equally important that the Security Council continue to bring to bear its influence on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate in a safe and secure manner and is allowed to operate freely in accordance with the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As long as the area of separation remains militarized and the presence of armed groups and/or Syrian armed forces continues, UNDOF will only fulfil its mandate in a limited manner. It is essential that this issue be addressed by the parties to the Agreement and in the wider framework of the Syrian political process. Furthermore, the reopening of the regular Qunaytirah crossing point would benefit the ability of UNDOF to implement its mandate. It is also necessary for UNDOF to continue to have at its disposal all means and resources necessary for it to return fully to the area of separation, conditions permitting.

44. The confidence and commitment of troop-contributing countries with respect to UNDOF remains a key factor in the mission's ability to carry out its mandate. I continue to count on the support of troop-contributing countries as UNDOF proceeds with its agreed plan for increased operations in the area of separation. I am grateful to the Governments of Bhutan, Czechia, Fiji, Finland, India, Ireland, Nepal and the Netherlands for their contributions, their commitment, their resolve and

their consummate professionalism. I am also thankful to the Member States contributing military observers to UNTSO.

45. I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential, and all the more so under the prevailing circumstances. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2018. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel also has expressed its agreement.

46. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to Major General Jai Shanker Menon, who completed his tour of duty on 30 September, for his dedication and leadership of UNDOF during a difficult period for the mission. I also wish to express appreciation to the military and civilian personnel serving in UNDOF and the military observers in Observer Group Golan, who continue to perform with efficiency and commitment, under extremely challenging circumstances, the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. I have full confidence that UNDOF will continue to use its best efforts to carry out its mandate under the leadership of Major General Francis Vib-Sanziri, who assumed the leadership of UNDOF on 11 November.


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December 2017
OGG observation post
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Small arms and light weapons

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

In its resolution 2220 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council on a biennial basis a report on the issue of small arms and light weapons, including on the implementation of the resolution.

The impact of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms continued to be of considerable concern to the United Nations and to the broader international community. Poorly regulated small arms are key enablers of armed conflict and a means of sustaining it. Their easy availability and the lack of adequate control systems facilitate a vast spectrum of human rights violations, aggravate poverty and impede sustainable development.

The landmark 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development crucially recognizes that only peaceful societies will achieve their desired level of sustainable development. Adequate small arms regulation and control is an important means of reducing armed violence, making communities better able to pursue sustainable development.

In an effort to operationalize many of the small-arms-related recommendations made previously to the Council, recommendations contained in previous reports (S/2008/258, S/2011/255, S/2013/503 and S/2015/289) and suggested concrete actions to address them are set out in annex I to the present report.

Pursuant to the request made in paragraph 28 of resolution 2220 (2015), annex II to the present report includes best practices and arrangements that could be used by the United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on the implementation and compliance monitoring of arms embargoes and the provision of assistance and expertise to host States, sanctions committees and expert groups.

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2220 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council on a biennial basis a report on the issue of small arms and light weapons. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. Resolution 2220 (2015) is the second Council resolution devoted to the thematic issue of small arms, and was adopted following the issuance of the previous report of the Secretary-General on this subject (S/2015/289).[1]

3. The present report provides an overview of significant developments and trends with regard to the issue of small arms and light weapons. In annex I, key recommendations made to the Security Council on this issue in previous reports of the Secretary-General (S/2008/258, S/2011/255, S/2013/503 and S/2015/289) are examined and concrete actions to take them forward are suggested.

4. Annex II contains a set of good practices and arrangements that could be used by United Nations peacekeeping operations and other Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on the implementation and compliance monitoring of arms embargoes (as mandated in paragraph 28 of resolution 2220 (2015)).

II. Significant developments and trends

5. The colossal negative consequences of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms have been indicated in previous reports of the Secretary-General on this topic.

6. The excessive accumulation and widespread availability of these weapons have increased the lethality and duration of violence. The international small arms trade was worth at least $6 billion in 2014 alone, with ammunition accounting for 38 per cent of all global transfers.[2] A significant portion of direct conflict deaths are attributable to the use of small arms, and nearly half of all violent deaths between 2010 and 2015 were caused by firearms.[3] Significantly, the rate of firearms-related homicides in post-conflict societies is frequently higher than that of battlefield deaths. These weapons are also the dominant tools of criminal violence in ostensibly non-conflict societies.

7. Small arms continued to facilitate a vast spectrum of acts that constitute human rights violations, including killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, enforced disappearance, torture and the forced recruitment of children. More human rights violations and abuses are committed with them than with any other weapon. Small arms have frequently played a role in the deaths of United Nations employees and peacekeepers, as well as workers from humanitarian and non-governmental organizations.

8. Armed violence erodes legal and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms and undermines the rule of law. Contemporary armed conflict is the main cause of people fleeing their homes, and has become the most common cause of food insecurity, as illustrated by the crises in Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen.

[1] Security Council resolution 2117 (2013) was the first Council resolution devoted to this theme.

[2] Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi, *Trade Update 2017: Out of the Shadows* (Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2017). Available from www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2017.pdf.

[3] Firearms were used in 32 per cent of conflict deaths in the period 2010–2015 (see www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-60.pdf).

9. Armed violence aggravates poverty, inhibits access to social services and diverts energy and resources away from efforts to improve human development. Armed conflict and high levels of armed violence represent a grave impediment to economic growth. There is nothing more damaging to an investment climate as armed insecurity.[4] Its detrimental effect on poverty and on access to social services, development and economic growth has a profound impact on fundamental economic and social rights. This understanding dovetails with the concept of "sustainable peace", as outlined in Security Council resolution 2282 (2016) and General Assembly resolution 70/262. Sustainable peace is both an enabler and an outcome of sustainable development.

10. Of growing concern are the increased links between transnational organized crime, illicit small arms trafficking and terrorism, as well as the increasing use of the Internet, including the "dark web", and emerging technologies for illicit trafficking and production.

11. While many challenges still exist, there have been several successes in the past two years. These include the adoption by consensus of the outcome document of the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (the International Tracing Instrument) (A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2, annex). At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, held in 2016, States made progress in discussions on key areas such as technological developments in small arms manufacture and the contribution of the Programme of Action to the attainment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

12. The successes also include the recommendations on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission at its 2017 substantive session (see A/72/42, annex). After nearly two decades without success, the Commission adopted measures that seek to enhance cooperation and build confidence with a view to promoting progress in arms control. The measures underscore the importance of conventional arms control to the maintenance and enhancement of regional and international peace and security.

III. Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

13. Through the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the General Assembly in September 2015, Member States recognized that sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security and that peace and security would be at risk without sustainable development. In the 2030 Agenda, Member States called for peaceful, just and inclusive societies that are based on respect for human rights, effective rule of law and good governance. Target 16.4 under Sustainable Development Goal 16, which is focused on promoting peaceful societies, providing access to justice and building effective institutions, includes a call for a significant reduction in illicit arms flows.

14. By virtue of the adoption of target 16.4, States have acknowledged that arms regulation contributes to mitigating the proliferation of illicit weaponry, thus creating minimum security conditions at the community level and, as a result, promoting conditions conducive to sustainable development. Furthermore, the 2030

[4] See World Bank, *World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone* (Washington, D.C., 2004), p. 79.

Agenda demonstrates that arms regulation, more than ever before, should be pursued through policies and actions built on the concept of measurability.

15. At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States underlined the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument to attaining Sustainable Development Goal 16 and target 16.4. States also noted that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons has implications for the realization of several other Sustainable Development Goals, including those relating to poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality, and safe cities and communities (see A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2, annex, paras. 25–26).

16. Also at the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States encouraged the development of national indicators based on the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument to measure progress made towards target 16.4. The data received from national reports on the implementation of those instruments could provide a solid basis for national indicators for progress on the target. Similarly, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime acknowledged at its eighth session the relevance of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Firearms Protocol) in supporting the implementation of target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals (see CTOC/COP/2016/15).

IV. Weapons and ammunition management in peace operations and conflict-affected settings

17. Weapons and ammunition management has become a critical component of United Nations peacekeeping operations and in the activities of the Security Council to address conflict-affected situations more generally. Attention to this issue was often reflected in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and physical security and stockpile management activities. For example, in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components have established weapon registration and marking systems to ensure the traceability of all weapons and ammunition collected during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

18. Adequate management of contingent- and civilian-controlled materiel, both arms and ammunition, is of utmost importance to ensure that these weapons are not lost, including through theft, seizure or diversion.

19. In 2010, the term "Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration" was used to describe evolving practices in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.[5] As a result of the changing nature of conflict, the international community has recognized an increased need for "community violence reduction" approaches to complement traditional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. Consequently, small arms and light weapons control activities have increasingly been prioritized in peace operation settings.

[5] United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practices in peace operations: a contribution to the New Horizon discussion on challenges and opportunities for United Nations peacekeeping", 18 January 2010. Available from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/2GDDR_ENG_WITH_COVER.pdf.

20. Further demonstrating shifts in approaches to peacekeeping, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, in its 2015 report, recognized the complex linkages between transnational illicit trafficking in weapons and the resilience of conflict-affected and post-conflict States (see A/70/95-S/2015/446).

21. In 2016, the Security Council, in resolutions regarding United Nations missions in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur and Haiti, acknowledged the role of poor arms and ammunition management in fuelling conflict and instability.[6]

22. Also in 2016, by its resolution 2287 (2016), the Security Council decided to make the Abyei Area "demilitarized" of any forces other than the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and the local police. In this connection, the Force is empowered to confiscate and destroy weaponry and report on possible arms movements into the Abyei Area. This mandate is an effective response to the previous recognition by the Council of the threat posed to peace and security in the Abyei Area arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

23. With regard to the work of the Security Council concerning Côte d'Ivoire (see, for example, resolution 2284 (2016)), the successful prioritization by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire of weapons and ammunition management, including through the registration of arms and related lethal materiel and the improvement of armouries, has been a concrete contribution to promoting stability.

V. United Nations support for weapons and ammunition management

24. United Nations entities undertook work in cooperation with host Governments to address weapons and ammunition management in conflict-affected settings. The United Nations continued to support States, upon request, in areas such as stockpile management and physical security, marking, tracing and record-keeping. Moreover, awareness-raising on the impact of small arms and light weapons remains an important component of United Nations work in this area.

25. Examples of United Nations support for national arms and ammunition management efforts are provided in the table below. These are in addition to the long-standing, critical support provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs to United Nations missions, including through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and mine action activities.

Examples of United Nations support for national arms and ammunition management efforts

Country	*Decision/action*
Central African Republic	The Security Council decided that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic would support the Central African Republic authorities in developing and operationalizing a national commission for small arms and light weapons to address civilian disarmament and illicit proliferation (resolution 2301 (2016), para. 34 (c) (iv)).

[6] See resolutions 2274 (2016), 2283 (2016), 2313 (2016) and 2296 (2016).

Country	*Decision action*
Haiti	The Security Council requested the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti to continue to support the Haitian authorities in the control of small arms, the development of a weapons registry and the revision of current laws on the importation and possession of arms (resolution 2313 (2016), para. 34).
Libya	The United Nations Support Mission in Libya has assisted national authorities, at their request, in establishing a national arms and ammunition management committee to improve coordination and decision-making between different ministries and agencies, as well as to ensure the consistent application of standards across government agencies, adequate resource mobilization and the development of an overarching national arms and ammunitions control framework and strategy.
Mali	The Security Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to assist Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and with weapons and ammunition management (resolution 2295 (2016), para. 20 (b)).

VI. Community-based initiatives

26. Several successes and lessons learned can be identified with regard to community-led violence and gun control programmes in various contexts. In the past two years, the increasing shift by law enforcement towards raising community-based public awareness on illegal firearms control has been notable. This shift has been evident in States such as Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama. To further promote alternatives to gang recruitment and the use of firearms during conflict resolution, the United Nations has supported various local gun-free school initiatives through the use of culture, arts, sports, life skills, positive parenting, gender identity, ethnic cohesion and faith-based programmes. Currently, more than 12 schools in Costa Rica are running a gun-free school programme and 22 municipalities with the highest firearms homicide rates in Honduras have developed community-based prevention models around firearms use. I encourage Member States to strengthen partnerships and coordination by further allocating the necessary resources to community policing and enforcement, capacity development, evidence-building and victim support programmes.

27. Local gun-free zones — which can address pressing feelings of insecurity at the community level — can be established if there is communal demand for such measures. Gun-free zones can only be successful if accompanied by effective policing.[7]

[7] *The Gun-Free Zone — A Tool to Prevent and Reduce Armed Violence*, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 25 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.14.IX.6). Available from www.un.org/disarmament/publications/occasionalpapers/no-25.

VII. Use of existing tools and instruments in the management of arms and ammunition in post-conflict settings

28. In previous reports to the Security Council on small arms, the value of the Register of Conventional Arms in providing a national baseline inventory of arms was emphasized. In its final report, the Panel of Experts on Yemen used data from the Register (see S/2016/73). More groups of experts are encouraged to make use of the information submitted to the Register, especially as a means of establishing a baseline to monitor potential violations of arms embargoes.

29. With regard to the scope of the Register of Conventional Arms, the General Assembly decided to adapt the Register in line with the recommendations made with the assistance of the 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on the matter (see A/71/259). Furthermore, States agreed to report on small arms and light weapons in parallel with the seven categories of the Register, on a trial basis, as part of a so-called "seven plus one" model.

VIII. Protection of civilians and human rights

30. High levels of arms and ammunition in circulation, exacerbated by poor management and controls, contribute to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (see S/2016/447, para. 17). In a report submitted to the Human Rights Council in 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted the direct risks posed to the rights to life, security and physical integrity by firearm-related violence and insecurity. Such violence and insecurity also affect other civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights, such as the rights to health, education, an adequate standard of living and social security and the right to participate in cultural life (see A/HRC/32/21, para. 52; see also A/54/2000, paras. 238–239, and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39, para. 16). The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children has noted the relationship between easy access to firearms and the denial of children's rights and acknowledged that access to firearms facilitates the recruitment of children to engage in organized crime.[8]

31. Recognizing and integrating gender as a factor in all cycles of small arms control enables the creation of more targeted measures focusing on, for example, the negative impact of small arms on the rights of women or methods that address masculinity and the need for power projection of young men. Given the highly gendered nature of the topic, mainstreaming gender into small arms control efforts ensures more effective outcomes. A growing body of research has demonstrated the visible linkages between gender and small arms and light weapons, including considerations related to domestic and intimate partner abuse, masculinity and cultural norms.[9] At the Sixth Biennial Meeting, States encouraged the collection of disaggregated data on gender and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, in particular for the purpose of improving corresponding national policies and assistance programmes (see A/CONF.192/BMS/2016/2, para. 60).

32. Enhancing respect for the law requires action in response to the high levels of poorly controlled arms and ammunition in circulation, which continue to contribute

[8] *Protecting children affected by armed violence in the community* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.I.15). Available from http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/2016/armedviolence/Armed%20Violence%20Publication%20Web.pdf.

[9] Dragan Božanić, *Gender and SALW in South East Europe: Main Concerns and Policy Response*, United Nations Development Programme (Belgrade, Grafolik, 2016), available from www.seesac.org/f/docs/Armed-Violence/Gender_and_SALW_publication_eng-web.pdf.

to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (see S/2016/447, para. 17). Violations have also occurred through illicit arms transfers, the diversion of arms and their transfer to States with insufficient regulations. In this regard, ratifying and complying with the Arms Trade Treaty, as well as relevant regional conventions are of key importance.

IX. Transnational organized crime

33. Transnational organized criminal groups generated increased levels of harm and violence. In its resolution 2220 (2015), the Security Council expressed concern about the close connection between international terrorism, transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money-laundering, other illicit financial transactions, illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons and arms trafficking.

34. There remained the need to adopt integrated approaches to address the root causes of transnational organized crime, including the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in small arms, their parts and components and ammunition. These approaches should take into account, where appropriate, economic and social factors that have an impact on arms-related crime, as well as cross-border criminality and trafficking flows, in particular relating to arms.

X. Terrorism and violent extremism

35. There has been growing recognition of the dangers posed by the acquisition of weapons by terrorist groups. The use of firearms in the perpetration of terrorist attacks in many countries has raised the urgency of addressing this issue.

36. The Security Council has been active in that regard. In its resolution 2370 (2017) on denying terrorists access to weapons, the Council urged Member States to undertake a set of measures at the national level to eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists, as well as to enhance regional and international cooperation in that regard. In its resolution 2322 (2016), the Council expressed its concern that terrorists benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms.

37. In its resolution 2253 (2015), the Security Council authorized the global arms embargo against individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. In line with the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, Member States should also strengthen subregional and regional organizations in monitoring the trafficking of small arms and heavy weapons (see A/70/674, para. 45 (a)). The adoption by the African Union, in January 2017, of its master road map of practical steps to silence the guns in Africa by the year 2020 constituted an important effort to enhance national capacities to prevent violent extremism, strengthen national disarmament programmes and address the illicit trafficking of arms.[10]

XI. Observations

38. Weapons and ammunition are tangible commodities upon which concrete and measurable actions can be taken to manage and control them (see S/2015/289, para. 14). On the basis of this understanding, I will consistently advocate for

[10] See African Union decision contained in Assembly/AU/6(XXVIII)/Rev.1, annex.

strengthening physical security and stockpile management measures for both weapons and ammunition and encourage the Security Council to do the same.

39. I encourage the continued, regular consideration by the Security Council of the issue of small arms. While a recurring thematic discussion is of key use in prioritizing action, I also support the mainstreaming of the issue of the illicit weapons trade, misuse and excessive accumulation into all relevant Council discussions. The maintenance of international peace and security, advances in development and the realization of human rights cannot be fully achieved and sustained if illicit small arms and ammunition continue to wreak havoc on communities.

40. I encourage the Security Council to continue to address weapons and ammunition management issues in a comprehensive manner. It is evident that addressing both issues together has proven effective when discussing the challenges of conflict and post-conflict situations. In terms of peace operations, I note the benefit when peace missions include a dedicated cell dealing with weapons and ammunition control matters.

41. I underscore the indispensability of introducing measurability in all activities relating to small arms control, consistent with the indicators for measuring progress on the Sustainable Development Goals.

42. Preventing conflict and building sustainable peace on the basis of respect for human rights, including accountability and non-discrimination, must be a key priority for the international community in its efforts to address the wide-reaching harm to civilians caused by small arms and light weapons.

43. It is also essential to enhance respect for international law and ensure accountability and good practice in that regard by parties to conflict. Preventing armed attacks against civilians in conflict settings, including United Nations personnel and humanitarian actors, must remain a central objective of the Security Council.

44. I will continue to encourage national authorities to make use of existing, practical standards and guidelines such as the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, with a view to enhancing small arms and ammunition control in support of the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. In addition, I will continue to advocate for the universalization of relevant legally-binding instruments, such as the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty, and the implementation of agreed instruments such as the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument.

45. I encourage Member States to make use of the International Criminal Police Organization Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System, which facilitates information exchange and investigative cooperation between law enforcement agencies in relation to the international movement of illicit firearms, as well as licit firearms that have been involved in the commission of a crime.

46. The consideration by the Security Council of measures to restrict the supply of ammunition to countries or regions threatened by, engaged in or emerging from armed conflict is a beneficial approach (see S/PRST/2002/30). It is important that the Council remain cognizant of the recurrently destructive effect of weapons and ammunition flows into vulnerable and fragile settings, irrespective of whether a United Nations mission is present.

47. Finally, the Third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms, scheduled to be held in June 2018, will provide an important opportunity for Council members and all States to demonstrate reinvigorated commitment to collective efforts at the national, regional and global levels to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

Annex I

Addressing past recommendations

1. The present report is the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the thematic issue of small arms and light weapons. In the four previous reports, numerous substantive recommendations have been made to address the cross-cutting and multidimensional challenges associated with the management of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition. In total, 48 recommendations have been provided to the Security Council for its consideration, relating to, inter alia, physical security and stockpile management, peacekeeping, arms embargoes, international standards and guidelines, armed violence and gender.

2. Many of the recommendations remain highly relevant in the context of the work of the Security Council and the United Nations more broadly. In this regard, particularly pertinent recommendations made in previous reports (S/2008/258, S/2011/255, S/2013/503 and S/2015/289) are listed in the table below, and specific suggestions to operationalize them are offered.

3. The suggested actions are intended to be as concrete as possible and are directed towards specific stakeholders, namely, the Security Council and, in some cases, the wider United Nations membership. Actions to operationalize the recommendations are also identified for the Secretariat and relevant entities, where applicable.

Small arms and light weapons: past recommendations and suggested future actions

Recommendation		*Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities*	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
Weapons and ammunition management			
S/2015/289, recommendation 1	Given the wide-ranging impact of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, it is recommended that the Security Council consistently address the arms situation when considering both geographic and thematic issues on its agenda.	Security Council	• May wish to request an assessment of: ◦ The treatment of small arms by the Security Council across its whole agenda, with the results to be presented in the next biennial report to the Council on small arms ◦ The women and peace and security mainstreaming model as a point of reference for the further mainstreaming of weapons and ammunition matters into the work of the Council. • Could consider requesting relevant United Nations entities, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Mine Action Service, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, UN-Women and UNODC, to participate in thematic and issue-focused briefings. Could refer to the best practices contained in the voluntary International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.
S/2015/289, recommendation 8; S/2013/503, recommendation 3	The Security Council should consider, on a case-by-case basis, the relevance of technologies such as time limitation or geographical limitation devices or biometric or radio frequency identification, to improve weapons stockpile management and reduce the diversion of weapons.	Security Council	• May wish to request a report outlining specific technologies that could improve weapons stockpile management with a view to combating diversion and improving tracing. • Could consider supporting measures to ensure the marking and registration of all weapons, particularly in cases where United Nations entities are deployed and can assist.
S/2011/255, recommendation 1	The Security Council may wish to encourage States to strengthen their tracing capacity and to enhance international cooperation regarding tracing in these contexts [conflict, post-conflict and conflict-prone situations], including with the United Nations.	Security Council	• Could encourage States to make use of tools to promote effective international and regional cooperation in tracing, such as with INTERPOL, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto and the International Tracing Instrument. • Should consider providing support to the work of groups and panels of experts on tracing requests.

Recommendation		*Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities*	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
			• May wish to promote the practical assistance provided by the United Nations on weapons tracing, including through module 05.31 of the International Small Arms Control Standards, the work of United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament and UNODC.
			• May encourage States to share information and best practices on safe storage, marking and destruction of surplus weapons to further prevent illicit transfers.
			• May wish to consider encouraging States to keep comprehensive records of seized arms to facilitate tracing.
S/2008/258, recommendation 11	The Security Council may wish to consider encouraging States to significantly enhance their efforts to verify end user certificates.	Security Council	May wish to consider supporting further research on various aspects of end use and end user controls, including risk assessment, end use and end user documentation, assurances and post-delivery cooperation. UNIDIR, along with other relevant research institutions, could be engaged by the Council in such tasks.
		All Member States	• Could consider development of an international framework for the authentication, reconciliation and standardization of end user certificates in the framework of, inter alia, a General Assembly resolution establishing a group of governmental experts to further explore the issue, and/or the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Tracing Instrument.
			• Could adopt a decision to begin work on such a framework at the Third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, in 2018.
S/2013/503, recommendation 2	I encourage all Member States to make every effort to secure arms and ammunition stockpiles from diversion. I encourage the Security Council to ensure that peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are mandated to assist host countries in their stockpile management.	United Nations system and other relevant entities	• The International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, as well as relevant tools that facilitate their use, should be integrated into the core training curricula of international peacekeeping training centres, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions should receive training as needed on the application of international standards.

Recommendation		Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
	Existing standards such the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines developed under the "Safer*Guard*" programme and the International Small Arms Control Standards should be fully utilized in arms and ammunition stockpile management practices. Member States in a position to do so should consider providing technical and financial assistance in this regard.		• Efforts should be made to enhance the practical applicability of existing standards and guidelines to assist host countries in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings. • Support should continue to be provided, upon request, to States in building capacity for arms and ammunition management, including through the activities of the Safer*Guard* programme.
S/2013/503, recommendation 11	The Security Council is encouraged to mandate United Nations peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions, in particular with respect to the disarmament aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform programmes, to support host countries' efforts to implement their commitments under relevant global and regional conventional arms control instruments, including the development of capacities to put in place longer-term arms control and regulation measures. Such support should be considered when planning integrated peace operations missions, as well as in the day-to-day operations of the missions. To this effect, use should be made of the International Small Arms Control Standards developed by the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism and of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.	Security Council	May consider consulting with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, the Mine Action Service and other relevant entities on the issue of mandating missions to assist host countries with disarmament aspects, including specific tasks related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction and security sector reform.
		United Nations system and other relevant entities	• The International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines should be integrated into the peace support operations planning process, as well as into the day-to-day activities of such operations, as relevant. • The Department of Peacekeeping Operations will appoint a Fire Explosive Safety Officer in each peacekeeping operation, where feasible, in accordance with module 12.10 of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. • Vulnerable States should continue to be assisted, upon request, in establishing longer-term arms control and regulation measures (legislative and operational), using the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines for guidance. • UNICEF and UNDP should continue to support reintegration programmes for former combatants and children associated with armed groups.

Recommendation		*Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities*	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
S/2011/255, recommendation 3	The Security Council may wish to encourage Member States to provide the United Nations, on a voluntary basis, with public information on the markings applied to ammunition for small arms and light weapons by manufacturers under their jurisdiction, as well as the markings on ammunition recovered from illicit use.	Security Council	• Could call upon all States, as appropriate, in the context of its relevant items, to provide support and ammunition marking information to the INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table, the INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network and the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System. • Could call upon States to share information submitted on national ammunition marking practices with INTERPOL for inclusion in the Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System.
		All Member States	• May consider providing resources to the Safe*r*Guard programme to undertake training on ammunition marking and capacity-building. • May consider aligning national marking practices with module 05.30 of the International Small Arms Control Standards, as appropriate.
Peacekeeping			
S/2015/289, recommendation 7	The Security Council should ensure that peacekeeping and special political missions are consistently mandated to assist host countries in the effective management of their arms and ammunition stockpiles. This includes, in accordance with the good practice demonstrated in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, provisions on the training of national security forces in weapons disposal, marking and recording and large-scale weapons collection and destruction programmes, in addition to the refurbishment of weapons and ammunition storage facilities and the promotion of compliance with existing standards.	Security Council	• May request briefings on good practices and lessons learned in peace operations mandated to assist host countries with effective arms and ammunition management (for example, in Abyei, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, Haiti, Liberia, Libya and Mali). • May also request briefings from the Mine Action Service on its relevant activities relating to weapons and ammunition management. • May consider mandating United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions to assist States in their efforts to establish baselines and benchmark progress made in arms and ammunition management.
		All Member States	• May consider use of existing guidance on destruction activities, including the International Small Arms Control Standards (module 05.50) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (module 10.10).

Recommendation		Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
	Member States should consider the provision of adequate technical and financial assistance in this regard.		• May consider means of harmonizing information collected on illicit weapons and ammunition across United Nations missions to better understand trends of illicit cross-border flows. • May wish to consider providing support to UNIDIR to undertake relevant studies, in cooperation with host States and relevant United Nations mission staff, to identify approaches to strengthen the management of arms and ammunition by peacekeeping missions.
S/2008/258, recommendation 9	Destruction of surplus ammunition stockpiles should be a priority for relevant peacekeeping missions and Governments.	Security Council	May wish to request a review of the mandate of the peace operations in Abyei, taking into account the destruction component, and derive good practices and lessons learned.
		United Nations system and other relevant entities	Peacekeeping operations should consider supplementary budget lines for project-specific ammunition stockpile destruction, including for relevant Mine Action Service operations.
S/2011/255, recommendation 2	In post-conflict weapons collection programmes, weapons should be recorded in sufficient detail to ensure accountability and to facilitate their tracing in the event of diversion. Record-keeping systems should be designed in such a way as to ensure that personnel are aware of the types of information that they need to record, including ammunition markings. The International Small Arms Control Standards currently being developed by the United Nations will provide practical guidance in this regard.	All Member States	Should consider utilizing, promoting and supporting the use of module 05.30 of the International Small Arms Control Standards, on marking and tracing, and the relevant modules of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.
Arms embargoes			
S/2015/289, recommendation 9	Countries subject to an arms embargo should consider reporting to the existing transparency mechanism of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.	Security Council	• May wish to request the Secretariat to organize a briefing on reporting to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms in the context of peace operations.

Recommendation		*Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities*	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
			• May consider including language in relevant resolutions calling upon States subject to an arms embargo to report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.
S/2008/258, recommendation 5	Peacekeeping missions mandated to monitor arms embargoes should increasingly seek to assign this task to a dedicated unit equipped with the capacity to carry it out comprehensively.	Security Council	May wish to review the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a view to outlining good practices and lessons learned on the role of monitoring the relevant arms embargoes.
S/2013/503, recommendation 9	The Security Council may wish to call for increased assistance for States bordering a country where an arms embargo is in place. If these bordering States themselves host a United Nations peacekeeping, political or peacebuilding mission, the Council should mandate these missions to assist their host Governments in complying with their arms embargo obligations by, inter alia, setting up arms and ammunition management cells.	Security Council	May wish to hold informal consultations with States bordering a country where an arms embargo is in place and invite an exchange of views on additional resources that may be required to assist in compliance with the embargo; discussions could include relevant implementing entities, such as the Mine Action Service of the United Nations, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the Department of Field Support.
Community safety and law enforcement			
S/2015/289, recommendation 6	States should aim to have their relevant law enforcement officials trained in the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.	Security Council	• May request the Secretariat to provide an implementation support manual for the Basic Principles. • May wish to consider encouraging States to make use of the resource book on the use of force and firearms in law enforcement, developed jointly by UNODC and OHCHR.
Protection of civilians/gender			
S/2013/503, recommendation 4	I encourage regular information exchange between the informal expert group on the protection of civilians of the Security Council, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other relevant United Nations entities, as appropriate, including the Office of the Special Representative for	Security Council	• May wish to request the Secretariat to share relevant information with the informal expert group on the protection of civilians on situations created or exacerbated by illicit arms flows, not only prior to the renewal of mandates of peace operations, but also during the consideration of new protection of civilians mandates.

Recommendation		Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities	
Reference	Text of recommendation	Entity	Action
	Children and Armed Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. I also encourage the informal expert group on the protection of civilians to consider ways in which relevant Council resolutions might better respond to challenges relating to the protection of civilians, in particular women and children, in situations created or exacerbated by illicit arms flows.		**• May also request a cross-cutting briefing on small arms-related issues, including on gender perspectives (in the form of an Arria-formula meeting of the Council).**
Armed violence			
S/2011/255, recommendation 5	There is a continued need to develop measurable goals on armed violence prevention and reduction to be achieved by 2015.	Security Council	• Taking into account the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, data reported with regard to Sustainable Development Goal indicator 16.4.2 could be considered in the context of the work of the Council insofar as relevant trends and conclusions drawn from the data could inform Council resolutions and reports and the work of groups of experts. • Could encourage States to report on indicator 16.4.2 on illicit arms flows, for example, through their biennial national report on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and data collection on illicit firearms trafficking through the framework of the Firearms Protocol.
S/2011/255, recommendation 6	The Security Council may wish to further identify ways to increase compliance by non-State armed groups with international norms relating to the use and stockpiling of weapons and ammunition in times of conflict.	Security Council	In view of the likelihood that non-State actors may store weapons and ammunition in temporary conditions or in smaller quantities than government forces, the Council may encourage the dissemination and utilization by peacekeepers, United Nations police and other stakeholders of existing voluntary guidance, such as module 04.20 of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

Recommendation		*Suggested actions for States actions identified for the United Nations system and other relevant entities*	
Reference	*Text of recommendation*	*Entity*	*Action*
S/2015/289, recommendation 3	More research to assist policymakers in addressing the causes and consequences of armed violence is required. The criminal violence that frequently replaces political violence in post-conflict periods is often difficult to redress through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and small arms control measures.	Security Council	May wish to request, through the Secretary-General, relevant United Nations entities to undertake research on the causes and consequences of armed violence, including links to the illicit trafficking in arms and its connection with organized crime and criminal violence, and to encourage Member States to provide qualitative and quantitative data for such research.

Abbreviations: INTERPOL, International Criminal Police Organization; OHCHR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; UNDP, United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDIR, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; UN-Women, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.

Annex II

Role of United Nations field missions in supporting the monitoring of arms embargoes

1. In paragraph 28 of its resolution 2220 (2015), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to examine and present best practices and arrangements that could be used by the United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council-mandated entities to guide the implementation of their mandated tasks on the implementation and compliance monitoring of arms embargoes and the provision of assistance and expertise to host States, sanctions committees and expert groups.

2. Pursuant to that request, the various mechanisms instituted by the United Nations in its field missions (also referred to as peace operations) were examined and best practices drawn from those experiences for the consideration of the Security Council when mandating new missions or adjusting the mandates of current ones with arms embargo measures. These practices, which apply to all arms embargo measures, including with regard to small arms and light weapons, can be used by field missions in carrying out their mandated tasks.

Arms embargo monitoring and compliance arrangements of United Nations field missions

3. Eight field missions are currently mandated by the Security Council to support United Nations arms embargoes,[1] but the arrangements by which they implement their mandates to monitor the implementation and compliance with Council-mandated arms embargoes vary considerably.

4. In a peacekeeping context, highlighted in my previous reports on small arms and light weapons, an Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit was established within the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).[2] In addition to personnel from the Mission's military component, the Unit was staffed by specialized civilian experts (arms, customs and information analysts). The permanent presence of such staff in the country allowed for the continuous monitoring of the flows of arms and ammunition, centralized and systematic data collection and on-site analysis. The Unit established country-specific arms and ammunition profiles and other tools that greatly advanced arms embargo monitoring.

5. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), by comparison, created an arms embargo working group in January 2015 to collect and synthesize information. In October 2015, the working group was reinforced by an arms embargo cell situated within the Mission's Joint Mission Analysis Cell, with support from the Mine Action Service of the United Nations. The development of the cell is still under way, but includes arms embargo analysts and technical experts.

[1] The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

[2] The arms embargo mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire was terminated in 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2283 (2016).

6. Another mechanism used to monitor compliance with arms embargoes in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)[3] were the firearms inspection teams from the Mission's civilian police contingents, which regularly inspected the Government's armouries to ensure weapons were properly marked and stored. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur, on the other hand, established a focal point within the Mission to share information on the arms embargo with the Panel of Experts on the Sudan.

7. Most missions, however, do not have dedicated units but have relied on their respective Joint Mission Analysis Cells to implement such mandated tasks. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) is an example of a field mission whose Joint Mission Analysis Cell monitors arms embargo compliance.

8. In special political missions, arms embargo monitoring and compliance arrangements are generally not as extensive as those in peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, these missions have established a variety of arrangements to support relevant arms embargo regimes. The Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), for example, provides advisory and capacity-building support to the Federal Government of Somalia to help it to meet its arms embargo obligations.

9. There is no one arrangement that is appropriate for all field missions in implementing arms monitoring mandates. It is important, however, that form follow function. Some field missions are mandated to cooperate with sanctions committees and their respective expert panels[4] by sharing relevant information and assisting host Governments with exemption requests.[5] Others have been mandated to carry out a more comprehensive set of tasks that may include monitoring compliance with the arms embargo and, in some cases, actively conducting inspections to enforce the arms embargo.[6] On the basis of the feedback received from expert panels and other relevant stakeholders, the presence of dedicated arms embargo monitoring staff within field missions where an arms embargo is in place strengthens monitoring and compliance of the arms embargo measures. This is all the more important given that many of the expert panels dealing with arms embargo monitoring are not based in the mission area on a permanent basis.

10. **The appropriate structural arrangements and capabilities of a United Nations peace operation to carry out any arms embargo-related tasks should be factored into mission planning at the time of establishment of the mandate and whenever the mandate is reviewed. Dedicated arms embargo monitoring units, appropriately resourced with the requisite experts, should be considered in countries where the mission has an extensive Council-mandated arms embargo inspection and enforcement mandate. Where arms embargo mandates are more limited and where field missions have utilized their Joint Mission Analysis Cells to undertake arms embargo-related tasks, such missions could consider dedicating a small number of staff to assist in the monitoring of and compliance with arms embargoes. The review carried out by the Secretariat has shown that the ability of United Nations peace operations to effectively carry out the arms embargo-related tasks is largely dependent on the technical expertise and relevant skill sets in areas such as arms tracing, border control, customs and**

[3] The arms embargo mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia was terminated in 2016 pursuant to Security Council resolution 2288 (2016).

[4] Currently, of the nine expert panels, two are based in New York, one is based in Nairobi and six are home-based.

[5] These missions include UNAMA, UNAMI and UNSOM.

[6] These missions include MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNAMID.

weapons storage. According to the review, there are therefore benefits to be drawn from Member States engaging with the Secretariat on how best they can contribute personnel with applicable technical expertise to serve in relevant United Nations field missions.

11. **While the structural arrangements for missions to fulfil arms embargo-related mandates may vary, the review has highlighted the importance of consistency across field missions in undertaking arms embargo-related tasks. In this connection, the Secretariat intends to develop relevant guidelines and standard operating procedures on how field missions could be structured to undertake arms embargo monitoring and compliance tasks, where appropriate. Particularly in contexts in which the United Nations is engaged in the exercise of good offices, mediation and reconciliation efforts, the role of a mission should be considered carefully.**

Provision of assistance and expertise to host States

12. Where mandated and requested, United Nations field missions provide essential and effective assistance to host States in strengthening the monitoring of and compliance with arms embargoes through technical assistance and capacity-building. MINUSCA and UNSOM, for example, provide technical assistance with other United Nations partners to host States to manage weapons, ammunition and related infrastructure. The Maritime Task Force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon works to enhance the capacity of the Lebanese Navy, including through joint training, to prevent the entry of unauthorized arms and related materiel into Lebanon by sea.

13. Field missions are also well placed to raise awareness about the arms embargoes with the respective host Government. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya, for example, has provided briefings to the Libyan authorities on the purpose, scope and implementation of the arms embargo, including detailed guidance on the exemption provisions. This has included the provision of simplified flow charts and checklists, as well as "model language" for drafting exemption requests and end user certificates. MONUSCO has been working with the military and justice sectors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to increase cooperation and access to information related to non-compliance with the arms embargo.

14. Regular, direct and structured engagement between the field mission and the appropriate government authorities, specifically on the implementation of the arms embargo or the provision of assistance, is critical. A good example is provided by UNSOM, which assists the Federal Government of Somalia through the Office of the National Security Adviser to build its capacity to comply with obligations under the arms embargo, including advisory support for the development of notifications and reporting, as well as longer-term capacity for the development of a national framework for weapons and ammunition management in accordance with international standards and the improvement of infrastructure for the reception and processing of weapons imports and donations and capacity-building. **Host States are encouraged to appoint national focal points through which missions can engage and channel capacity-building assistance to relevant government departments and agencies crucial to the implementation of the arms embargo. Where feasible, a joint arms embargo working group, comprising the United Nations peace operation and relevant government agencies, could also be formed to strengthen information-sharing and capacity-building assistance. Missions should also draw upon the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, which, as the repository of knowledge and practice on sanctions issues, has the responsibility to assist them in providing**

relevant support and assistance to host countries and other Member States in the implementation of arms embargoes.

15. **Where appropriate, the needs of and the provision of technical assistance to host States with respect to the implementation of arms embargoes should be reviewed periodically, particularly when the Council is considering adjusting the measures.** In 2014 and 2015, United Nations inter-agency missions were undertaken at the request of the Council to assess the arms embargoes in Somalia (see S/2014/243) and Liberia (see S/2014/707 and S/2015/590). Assessment missions have proven to be a useful tool to bring together all relevant United Nations actors in the field and at Headquarters to provide the Council with relevant input for their reviews of sanctions measures. Relevant tools developed by the United Nations, such as the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, should be fully utilized in such assessments in order to ensure that gaps in capacity to safely and securely manage arms and ammunition are identified and addressed prior to an embargo being eased or lifted.

Provision of assistance and expertise to sanctions committees and expert panels

16. Field missions mandated to support the implementation of arms embargoes are specifically tasked with engaging with relevant sanctions committees and their expert panels. Under the Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire sanctions regimes, which have now been terminated, UNMIL and UNOCI were mandated to provide written reports to their respective sanctions committees. While current field missions do not have similar reporting requirements, information is shared directly by the mission with the committee through periodic briefings often undertaken by the Head of Mission. **The Security Council and its sanctions committees are encouraged to continue to request such briefings from the field on arms embargo monitoring and compliance to better consider the appropriate complementarity of sanctions with political, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes.**

17. Feedback from host Governments, regional States and members of the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies has highlighted the value of regular regional briefings as an opportunity for regional States to provide feedback on strengthening monitoring of and compliance with sanctions measures. Furthermore, visits by the Chair of the sanctions committee to countries have also been identified as useful for the work of the Council and its subsidiary organs to raise awareness about United Nations sanctions regimes and strengthen monitoring of and compliance with the specific sanctions measures. **In this regard, the Security Council and its subsidiary organs may wish to reinforce regional briefings, as well as periodic visits by committee Chairs, to concerned States and to engage directly with field missions on the ground to both promote awareness and strengthen monitoring of and compliance with sanctions measures.**

18. Given that many expert panels are not based in a country subject to an arms embargo or in nearby countries in the region, most direct cooperation on arms embargo implementation and compliance monitoring occurs between field missions and expert panels. Several good examples of ways in which missions had structured information-sharing relationships with expert panels and the Security Council Affairs Division were found in the review. **Field missions typically nominate a focal point within the mission to facilitate information exchange and logistical support with expert panels. In general, placing the focal point in the Office of the Chief of Staff is a useful modality to promote awareness of the mandate of the expert panel across the mission.**

19. While all expert panels have appreciated the cooperation with field missions, the nature of the information exchanged differs in scope and quality. Such differences are a product of many factors, including variations in the mandates of field missions, the specifics of the arms embargo sanctions regime, the receptivity of the host State to field mission involvement on arms embargo issues, the availability of resources and specialized personnel, and guidance provided to the field mission.

20. Informal guidelines developed in 2009 to enhance cooperation and information-sharing between peacekeeping missions and expert panels are now outdated. **The Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Working Group on United Nations Sanctions, have been tasked with developing uniform guidance for all field missions. These new guidelines will address the substantive and administrative aspects of cooperation, taking into account relevant challenges in relation to resources, the examination of new technologies, mandates, operational constraints, knowledge transfer and information-sharing.**

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Kazakhstan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 1 December 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations stating that Mr. Bauyrzhan Kerimkulov has been appointed alternate representative of Kazakhstan on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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